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 International Arbitration, Judicial 
Education, and Legal Elites 
CATHERINE A. ROGERS*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One potentially devastating critique of investment arbitration is that it under-
mines or hampers development of national legal institutions.  Investment arbitra-
tion was originally conceived of as means of encouraging foreign investment and 
strengthening rule of law for investment protection.  Critics often question wheth-
er it actually contributes to either of these goals.  If investment arbitration could 
not deliver on intended goals related to improvements in local legal institutions, it 
would be disappointing.  If, however, investment arbitration not only failed to 
deliver benefits to, but instead affirmatively undermined, local legal institutions, it 
would be devastating.  While numerous critics have leveled this charge, no empir-
ical evidence has been marshalled to support it. 
In response to critics’ contentions, commentators have offered various alter-
native possible accounts of the relationship between investment and international 
arbitration, and local courts and legal institutions.  One theory is that investment 
arbitration and local courts work in tandem, complementing each other.  Under 
this view, according to Susan Franck: 
Arbitration does not occur in a vacuum, and the existence of investment 
treaty arbitration does not eliminate the need to encourage the develop-
ment of a court system where rights are adjudicated in an impartial, fair, 
and predictable manner.  Investment treaty arbitration and national courts 
have a symbiotic relationship.  Fostering the development of the rule of 
law in national courts not only develops local judicial institutions, but it 




While this account is more optimistic, it is similarly opaque.  Most accounts 
fail to explain in detail how international and investment arbitration can spur im-
provements in local courts and legal institutions.  In other words, this debate about 
whether investment arbitration undermines or supports local legal institutions is 
persistent, but remains largely speculative.
2
  There are specific reasons why these 
competing hypotheses remain speculative. 
First, almost out of necessity, the competing hypotheses rest on numerous as-
sumptions about the features and dynamics of local legal systems.  But not all 
                                                          
 *  Professor of Law, Penn State Law; Professor of Ethics, Regulation & The Rule of Law at Queen 
Mary, University of London.  I am grateful for the helpful input from Chris Drahozal in writing this 
essay, and future collaboration with him on empirical work inspired by it.  
 1. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of 
Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 337, 368 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 365. 
1
Rogers: International Arbitration, Judicial Education, and Legal Elites
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
72 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2015 
legal systems in developing and emerging economies are the same, and their in-
ternal dynamics are difficult to assess accurately from afar. 
Second, most of these critiques presume foreign investors and investment ar-
bitration are the primary drivers in the relationship between investment arbitration 
and local legal institutions.  The assumption that external forces provide the pri-
mary incentives for local court reform is probably a natural corollary to the debate 
about investment arbitration’s ability to fulfill its own larger goals.  But such a 
focus on external drivers like investment arbitration ignores incentives for legal 
reforms that may exist in tandem with, but distinct from, investment arbitration.  
Finally, hypotheses about the effects of investment arbitration remain specu-
lative because empirically testing these hypotheses would be an exceptionally 
difficult, complex, and time-consuming task.  For example, some commentators 
have suggested that investment and international arbitration necessarily rely on 
support from national courts and this symbiotic relationship can generate a “race 
to the top.”3  To date, no accounts have provided a detailed account of how this 
hypothesized race to the top might occur and what its drivers might be. 
This essay sketches an alternative account of how investment arbitration af-
fects development of local legal institutions, in particular domestic courts.  When 
investment arbitration is introduced into a local legal environment, it becomes 
integrated with international commercial arbitration, and often domestic arbitra-
tion.  This integration occurs because the local economic elites, private law firms, 
and local businesses that deal with (or compete with) foreign investors and in-
vestment arbitration disputes also deal with international commercial matters, 
international commercial disputes, and domestic arbitration. 
These local economic and legal elites,
4
 meanwhile, have specific and personal 
interest in ensuring local legal institutions support arbitration and have the politi-
cal power to press for legal reforms to ensure this support.  These local elites also 
have incentives and opportunities to access well-established legal instruments and 
models, such as model laws, internationally accepted standards, rules, and struc-
tures.  These borrowed international sources for reform provide not only concrete, 
effective guidance but also an internationally established sense of legitimacy and 
access to an extensive international arbitration network that can be valuable for 
local elites. 
This alternative hypothesis is inspired by anecdotes and observations from 
my own personal experiences in various capacity-building projects in Palestine 
and Georgia, and has particular relevance to this Symposium on judicial educa-
tion.  It is often assumed the only form of judicial education needed for interna-
tional arbitration is training on how to keep judicial “hands off” arbitration pro-
ceedings and outcomes.  International arbitration reforms, however, integrate 
judges into various aspects of reforms, which in turn provide potential inspiration 
for improvements in local judiciaries and legal procedures. 
                                                          
 3. Id. at 367. 
 4. In this essay, I use the term “economic and legal elites” to refer to those members of society who 
wield significant power based on their economic power and political influence in political institutions.  
For a related definition of “legal elites” in emerging economies, see David B. Wilkins & Mihaela Papa, 
The Rise Of The Corporate Legal Elite In The Brics: Implications For Global Governance, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1149 (2013) (definining “legal elites” as “lawyers who work in law firms based in [emerging 
economies] that serve a clientele composed primarily of foreign and domestic corporations, and law-
yers who work in the internal legal departments of the growing number of corporations based in [these 
jurisdictions]”). 
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Ultimately, however, this account is still only a working hypothesis.  The re-
mainder of this essay sketches the underpinnings of this hypothesis and identifies 
factors that could be a basis for empirical evaluation in future work.  This essay 
also lays the groundwork for a more systematic exploration and empirical testing 
of this hypothesis in a collaborative work with Professor Chris Drahozal for con-
tribution to a larger work, Empirical Perspectives on the Legitimacy of Interna-




II.  INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AS NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON LOCAL 
COURTS 
As noted, many commentators suggest one negative consequence of invest-
ment arbitration is that it undermines development of local courts and local legal 
institutions.  For example, Tom Ginsburg argues “the decision to bypass domestic 
courts [by going to investment arbitration] may reduce courts’ incentives to im-
prove performance by depriving key actors from a need to invest in institutional 
improvement.”6  Susan Franck cites critics’ suggestions that “the existence of 
international dispute resolution for foreign investment inhibits the development of 
the rule of law in national courts by creating a regime that provides a privilege to 
foreign investors and removes investment disputes from local courts.”7 
Under this view, “foreign investors rationally refrain from championing good 
and generalized law reforms in the developing state, preferring instead to protect 
their interests by relying on the BIT rule of law enclave.”8  Ron Daniels takes this 
argument even further, reasoning “BITs enfeeble host state governments and, in 
sharp contrast to the claims made by supporters of BITs, will end up discrediting 
the normative legitimacy of the BIT as a rule of law demonstration project.”9 
Each of these explanations presumes that foreign investors and investment 
arbitration are the primary drivers either inspiring or undermining reform and 
development in local legal institutions.  These explanations, in other words, as-
sume that reforms inspired by foreign investment are transmitted directly from 
foreign investors (or investment treaties) to national governments. 
Governments are ultimately responsible for legal reforms, but they are per-
haps more responsive to pressures from internal constituencies than they are to 
external international forces.  Unlike other contexts involving internationally in-
spired legal reforms, the internal local constituencies implicated by investment 
arbitration have incentives to press for legal reforms that support international 
arbitration.  This incentive structure develops not because investment arbitration 
creates pressure from the outside.  It develops because when investment arbitra-
                                                          
 5. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGITIMATE ROLES OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE GLOB. ORDER, 
http://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/ (last visited Aug 6, 2015). 
 6. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 119 (2005). 
 7. Franck, supra note 1, at 365. 
 8. Id. at 366. 
 9. Ronald J. Daniels, Defecting on Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Subversion 
of the Rule of Law in the Developing World 2, UNIV. OF SIENA (Mar. 23, 2004), http://www.unisi.it/ 
lawandeconomics/stile2004/daniels.pdf (describing BITs as creating a “stand alone enclave” that 
allows “foreign investors [to be] largely insulated from the legal and political risks of contracting in the 
home state and relying on its institution”). 
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tion claims are commenced and defended, they implicate a host of legal elites that 
are, for both related and independent reasons, eager to engage with the larger in-
ternational arbitration community. 
III.  LOCAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND EFFORTS AT REFORM 
BITs include arbitration mechanisms because courts and legal institutions in 
many developing countries and emerging economies are ineffective and unrelia-
ble, particularly when foreign nationals are involved.
10
  The debate over the rela-
tionship between investment arbitration and weak local legal institutions naturally 
focuses on those two points of reference.  Treatment of this issue as a bilateral 
relationship ignores how international arbitration becomes integrated within lead-
ing figures in local legal communities. 
Integration vests local legal and business elites, who have an interest in politi-
cal stability and national legal institutions, in the success of arbitration and the 
legal institutions that support it.  Local legal elites also regard international com-
mercial arbitration as a means of access to the international legal community and  
its promises of future economic opportunities.  To develop these opportunities, 
local legal elites use their influence to strengthen national legal institutions in 
order to support international, and often domestic, arbitration.  Some of these 
efforts translate into legislative reforms, judicial training, reforms in legal educa-
tion, and attorney training that improve rather than detract from national legal 
institutions. 
Another important factor that distinguishes arbitration-related reforms from 
other types of international reforms is that international arbitration related reforms 
have concrete goals and are tied to specific economic interests.  These reforms can 
draw from a wealth of internationally established resources and models.  By con-
trast, efforts aimed more generically at improving the rule of law and strengthen-
ing legal institutions are typically framed as public law reforms, and headed by 
human rights and public law lawyers.  The goals of these reforms are stated in 
lofty, but somewhat ethereal terms such as “improving justice” and the “strength-
ening rule of law.”  The means for achieving these overarching goals can be diffi-
cult to identify.  Meanwhile, the effect of these goals may work against existing 
interests of those who benefit from or are invested in preservation of the status 
quo. 
By contrast, many reforms to promote domestic and international arbitration 
are based on well-established international sources and models.  Use of these in-
ternational models also introduces opportunities for local elites to interact with 
international elites who have developed or act as custodians for international 
sources and models. 
Although only anecdotal and impressionistic, observations in some develop-
ing and emerging economies suggest support for this hypothesis.  One particularly 
                                                          
 10. Some commentators argue that arbitration provisions are not necessary in developed economies 
that already have robust and effective local court systems that can competently and fairly address 
foreign investor claims.  See William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed 
Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5-8 (2006).  But see Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Attract Foreign Direct Investment?  Only a Bit-and They Could Bite (June 2003), http://elibrary.world 
bank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-3121. 
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robust example is Palestine.  Like other jurisdictions, Palestine has recently enact-
ed a series of arbitration-related reforms.  These reforms include a new draft arbi-
tration law that is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, extensive new training 
programs for arbitrators and judges, and recent accession to the New York Con-
vention.
11
  These reforms are being implemented formally by the Palestinian Au-
thority (PA), but the PA works closely with the International Chamber of Com-
merce of Palestine and its Arbitration Commission, which in turn works closely 
with a network of international arbitration organizations and international arbitra-
tion experts, including myself. 
This collaboration makes sense when you consider who is involved in the 
ICC Palestine.  The Board of Directors of the ICC Palestine is comprised of the 
“captains of industry” of the Palestinian economy.  Included among them are the 
owners and principals for the Bank of Palestine, the sole Palestinian Coca-Cola 
distributorship, the largest Palestinian holding company, and others who have 
enormous stakes in the Palestinian economy.  Consequently, they also hold an 
interest in legal institutions that can provide adequate protection for their econom-
ic interests.  The Arbitration Commission of the ICC Palestine, meanwhile, is 
comprised of leading legal elites—those Palestinian attorneys who typically have 
at least some international clients and local clients with international commercial 
transactions and disputes. 
Meanwhile, when the ICC Palestine, working in conjunction with the ICC Is-
rael, wanted to establish an arbitration center for resolution of commercial dis-
putes between Palestinians and Israelis, rather than start from scratch, they mod-
eled the rules for the new Jerusalem Arbitration Center (JAC) after the famed 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.  By adopting the ICC model, and 
expressly involving the ICC in the venture, the JAC not only ensured that its rules 
would have time-tested functionality and efficacy, it also ensured the ICC was 
actively involved in the process of creating and promoting the JAC. 
Although a very different place with a very different legal culture and legal 
history, recent legal reforms in Georgia are similarly being headed up by local 
legal and economic elites, working in conjunction with the international arbitra-
tion community.  In recent years, a new Georgia Arbitration Association (GAA) 
was founded, as a body that brought together the leading providers of domestic 
arbitration who are also among those most interested in and integrated with inter-
national commercial activities and international commercial disputes. 
Efforts to develop and fortify local arbitration, predictably, have Georgia 
turning to international sources for guidance.  For example, Georgia adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in 2009.  In October of 2014, the new Georgian Interna-
tional Arbitration Centre adopted arbitration rules that “reflect best international 
practices and include many innovations from the recent ICC and LCIA arbitration 
rules, firmly establish GIAC as the leading dispute resolution institution in the 
Caucasus – Black Sea – Caspian Region.”12 
                                                          
 11. Although accession to the New York Convention was part of a political strategy by the Palestin-
ian Authority to join as many treaties and conventions as possible, interest and research into becoming 
a party to the New York had begun long before and independent of accession to other conventions. 
 12. See Timothy Lindsay et al., Georgian International Arbitration Centre Adopts New Arbitration 
Rules, DECHERT LLP (Oct. 2014), http://sites.edechert.com/10/3834/october-2014/georgian-interna 
tional-arbitration-centre-adopts-new-arbitration-rules.asp. 
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In addition to these reforms, the Georgia Arbitration Association (GAA) has 
adopted a new code of ethics for arbitrators, which borrows quite heavily from the 
American Arbitration Association’s Code of Ethics.  This new Code introduced 
new ideas about what constitutes a conflict of interest for arbitrators in concrete, 
measurable terms.  The GAA introduced the new Code at a conference that also 
examined various potential enforcement mechanisms that create incentives for 
arbitrators to comply with in order to ensure future appointments. 
These reforms were specifically aimed at arbitrators and arbitrator conduct.  
One of the most striking moments at the conference, however, was when a Geor-
gian appellate court judge stood up and said something to the effect (I was listen-
ing to a simultaneous translation) that if the GAA was going to raise the standards 
for conduct for arbitrators, it would put pressure on judges to also raise their 
standards of conduct.  This one quote offers a possible explanation of how the 
race to the top, imagined by some commentators, is being facilitated.  National 
judges are not simply regarding investment arbitration’s outcomes and impact as a 
competition, they are instead participating in local reform efforts headed by local 
elites that aim to improve domestic and international arbitration.  They are re-
sponding to specific provisions in those reforms, rather than abstract notions about 
self-improvement and the rule of law.  While this is just an anecdote, it seems to 
provide a potentially compelling narrative about how international and investment 
arbitration affect local judges and may also inspire judicial improvements. 
IV.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND FUTURE EMPIRICAL TESTING 
The thesis of this essay gives rise to testable implications that could fill gaps 
in the existing speculative debate and that differ from those hypotheses tested in 
previous empirical studies on the impact of investment arbitration on national 
legal institutions.  As noted in the introduction, this empirical work will be taken 
up with Professor Drahozal under the auspices of a PluriCourts research project.  
This conclusion, therefore, previews some of the ways in which that research will 
differ from earlier research and hypotheses about the relationship between invest-
ment arbitration and local legal reforms. 
First, prior studies testing the effect of BITs on national legal institutions have 
used the number of BITs or the dates on which BITs entered into force as explana-
tory variables rather than the existence or number of investment arbitration pro-
ceedings.
13
  The thesis of this essay suggests, instead, that the relevant variable 
that triggers local reforms is not the adoption of BITs, but instead the filing of 
investment arbitration cases under the BITs.  The filing and defense of investment 
arbitration cases actively involves legal elites in the international arbitration pro-
cess, and ties investment arbitration into integrated initiatives to promote interna-
tional and domestic arbitration.  In other words, it is not the adoption of BITs or 
the prospect of arbitral decisionmaking under the BIT that matters, but instead 
local self-interested reforms that relate to, but are also distinct from, investment 
arbitration. 
                                                          
 13. JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 163 (2011) 
(“The BIT variable is simply the number of BITs of a country in a given year.”); Ginsburg, supra note 
6, at 120-22 (examining the number and timing of BITs). 
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Second, prior studies attempting to evaluate the impact of investment arbitra-
tion have examined aggregate rule of law measures for a country’s legal institu-
tions as a whole, and considered almost exclusively the incentives and behavior of 
public actors.
14
  The thesis of this essay suggests instead that an assessment of the 
impact of investment arbitration on domestic legal systems should focus more 
narrowly on domestic courts and on local legal communities, as well as on arbitra-
tion-specific legal reforms, rather than on abstract conceptions of or measures for 
the rule of law more generally.  Local courts and law firms are the national legal 
institutions most directly involved with international commercial arbitration. 
 
                                                          
 14. SASSE, supra note 13, at 165 (examining “government effectiveness,” “regulatory quality,” “rule 
of law,” and “corruption control”); Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 120-22. 
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